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Women’s Rights as 
Proletarian Rights
Yamakawa Kikue, Suffrage, and 
the “Dawn of Liberation”
Elyssa Faison
In the first postwar issue of the newly resuscitated journal Fujin kōron (Women’s forum), the essayist and socialist feminist Yamakawa 
Kikue offered her assessment of newly granted women’s suffrage rights 
for postwar Japan. In “Standing at the Dawn of Liberation: An Historic 
General Election and Women’s Suffrage,” Yamakawa anticipated with 
great hopefulness the upcoming general election of 1946, which was to 
be the first in which women would be allowed to vote and stand for 
office.1 In this essay Yamakawa, who would soon be named the first 
director of the Women’s and Minors’ Bureau of the newly created Labor 
Ministry, celebrated women’s suffrage and the general election, saying 
that “equal political rights will translate into social and economic equal-
ity for women. Inequality in education, work, and the family system will 
be abolished.”2
On the face of it, such an optimistic statement might seem to con-
tradict the prewar position of the socialist and communist left in which 
Yamakawa had been active since the 1910s. That is, the prewar left (and 
Yamakawa working within it) had argued that only through the aboli-
tion of the capitalist system could full human rights for all peoples be 
achieved, while her 1946 statement expressed hope that political rights for 
men and women would translate into social and economic equality. How, 
then, could Yamakawa now celebrate not the abolition of capitalism, but 
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the extension of political rights even if, as she noted in her essay, most 
women would probably end up voting for conservative parties that did 
not advocate for women’s interests?
Understanding this apparent tension in Yamakawa’s prewar and 
postwar positions with regard to the possibilities of true liberation for 
women through the granting of women’s suffrage becomes possible by 
considering her holistic and historicist theory of the state and of human 
rights—a theory in which she refused to trade off considerations of class 
for those of gender, or vice versa. Her contemporaries in the women’s suf-
frage movement typically eschewed class analysis, and were dedicated to 
a program of expanding rights within the existing framework set by the 
Meiji Constitution and its associated laws. While proponents of women’s 
suffrage like Hiratsuka Raichō, Oku Mumeo, and Ichikawa Fusae lob-
bied for revision of the Civil Code, which subordinated married women 
to male heads of household, and against laws that prevented women 
from attending political meetings, they did not identify deeper struc-
tural problems in the character of the state. By examining Yamakawa’s 
work alongside that of women’s suffrage leaders like Ichikawa and the 
policies and proposals of the Women’s Suffrage League (Fusen Kakutoku 
Dōmei) that Ichikawa co-founded and helped lead, it becomes clear that 
Yamakawa’s pre- and postwar assessments of the importance of women’s 
suffrage are largely consistent with her overall view of the prewar state 
as fundamentally authoritarian and anti-democratic in both its legal and 
economic nature. For Yamakawa, the collapse of the authoritarian state—
even though it took place as a result of defeat in war rather than through 
class struggle—allowed for the possibility that human rights could be 
attained. Additionally, I argue that Yamakawa—usually described as a 
theorist rather than an activist—needs to be placed back into discussions 
of women’s and workers’ rights activism. While she was a prolific writer 
and a gifted theoretician, she was also an activist in both women’s and 
socialist organizations from the time she finished her higher education 
through her service to the state bureaucracy.
The Reluctant Suffragist
Leaders of Japan’s women’s suffrage movement worked successfully to 
overturn a legal ban on women’s right to political assembly in the 1920s, 
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and continued through the end of the war to push for changes to Japan’s 
Civil Code, which dictated the legal rights and responsibilities of women 
and men within a highly patriarchal family structure. Such efforts rep-
resented the interests of an almost exclusively middle-class suffragist 
movement with the specific goal of a particular type of political enfran-
chisement—namely, the addition of women to the category of Japanese 
imperial subjects who would hold the rights to vote and stand for office 
in a political system defined by the Meiji Constitution. Yamakawa chal-
lenged the very foundations of that political system, while maintaining 
throughout her life a pragmatism that kept her from charges of ideologi-
cal extremism, and which always took the actual material conditions of 
Japanese women into consideration.3
The basic outlines of Yamakawa Kikue’s contributions to the devel-
opment of feminism in prewar Japan have been amply noted in historical 
literature.4 As a founding member of the Red Wave Society (Sekirankai), 
Japan’s first socialist women’s organization, and as one of the most vis-
ible socialist women in prewar Japan, Yamakawa is among the most heav-
ily cited socialist women of the early twentieth century, in part because 
she was also one of the most prolific. She is perhaps better known for her 
engagement with liberal women’s rights activists, who she debated in a 
range of women’s magazines throughout the 1910s and 1920s, since those 
debates took place in the newly emergent popular press. But her partici-
pation in male-dominated socialist organizations and her interventionist 
writings on behalf of women within those organizations directed toward 
her male socialist peers were equally substantial. She argued continually 
and passionately with her male colleagues, trying to force them to rec-
ognize that the concerns of proletarian women could not be separated 
from those of proletarian men. And while she did not always succeed in 
convincing them to adopt her proposals, she shifted socialist discourse 
in significant ways that forced a consideration of women and their rela-
tion to class. Additionally, Yamakawa’s popular nonfiction writings, 
including an important study commissioned by the famous ethnologist 
Yanagita Kunio on the nature of Tokugawa-era samurai families and 
women’s position within them, found a substantial audience throughout 
the prewar and wartime years.5
Yamakawa’s postwar life and activities have been largely ignored, 
despite the important role she played as the first director of the Labor 
6715_Book.indd   17 8/3/17   3:42 PM
This content downloaded from 129.15.64.253 on Mon, 27 Aug 2018 21:05:08 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
18  Elyssa Faison
Ministry’s Women’s and Minors’ Bureau, and her ongoing engagement 
with women’s and workers’ rights activism. She was especially active 
in the years immediately following the end of the war. In March 1946, 
she joined with other women’s rights activists from across the politi-
cal spectrum to form the Women’s Democratic Club (Fujin Minshu 
Kurabu) “to promote the participation of women in politics” in this 
crucial time before women would be allowed to cast their first votes in 
Japan the following month.6 A year later she founded the Democratic 
Women’s Association (Minshu Fujin Kyōkai), an organization affiliated 
with the short-lived Democratic People’s Federation (Minshu Jinmin 
Renmei) formed and led by her husband, the prominent leftist intellec-
tual Yamakawa Hitoshi. She held the position of founding director of the 
Women’s and Minors’ Bureau from 1947 to 1951, beginning under social-
ist prime minister Katayama Tetsu. That she stayed in this position after 
Katayama stepped down in 1948 and served under two prime ministers 
from the conservative Liberal Democratic Party suggests how effective 
she was. The historian Takemae Eiji claims that due to her strong leader-
ship of the Bureau, “women subsequently were appointed to head other 
Ministry bureaux as well.”7 She also continued publishing, with Japanese 
Democratization and Women (Nihon no minshuka to josei) and For the 
Women of Tomorrow (Ashita no josei no tame ni) appearing in 1947, a new 
journal called Women’s Voice (Fujin no koe, affiliated with the Women’s 
Division of the Socialist Party) founded in 1951, and an autobiography 
titled A Record of Two Generations of Women (Onna nidai no ki) pub-
lished in 1956.8
Yamakawa was born only one generation after the abolition of the 
samurai class, as the daughter of a scholarly and progressive-minded 
samurai family. She attended Tsuda Women’s College starting in 1908 
and early in her life expressed an interest in working for the betterment 
of women.9 In 1916 she married the communist activist and theoreti-
cian Yamakawa Hitoshi, founder in 1922 of the short-lived prewar Japan 
Communist Party, and a leader of the Labor-Farmer faction within the 
Japanese communist movement. She is best known for her position in 
debates on prostitution and motherhood, in which she consistently chal-
lenged liberal feminists (who she termed “bourgeois feminists”) on the 
possibility of women achieving full rights within a capitalist system.10 
While Yamakawa never actively advocated for suffrage rights, under-
standing her position with regard to the issue of formal political rights 
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for women is crucial to understanding the continuity of her pre- and 
postwar writings.
An examination of two key moments in the movement for expanded 
suffrage rights in Japan allows us to better understand Yamakawa’s his-
toricist critique of liberal efforts to expand civic rights within the frame-
work of what Andrew Gordon has referred to as Japan’s prewar system of 
“imperial democracy.”11 These were the passage of a Universal Manhood 
Suffrage Law in 1925 and the acquisition of women’s suffrage that came 
with the promulgation of the postwar Constitution in 1946. Although 
Yamakawa generally supported expanded civic rights for women includ-
ing suffrage, she never believed that suffrage rights in and of themselves 
would create class or gender equality. For this reason, and to better com-
prehend the scope of her arguments about women’s rights as proletarian 
rights and proletarian rights as women’s rights, we must often rely on her 
broader arguments on topics that do not always address the issue of suf-
frage directly.
Suffrage and Proletarian Rights
The Universal Manhood Suffrage Law, passed in 1925, abolished tax 
requirements and allowed males over twenty-five years old to vote and 
run for office in local and national elections. The first elections held 
after this significant expansion of voting rights took place in 1928, and 
included colonial peoples, especially the large proportion from Korea, as 
new voters and as candidates in local elections. By 1932 a Korean named 
Pak Chungum, with close connections to the Japanese police regime, 
became the first Korean elected to the Japanese House of Commons, 
marking the emergence of Koreans resident in Japan as a visible constitu-
ency in national politics. As the historian Matsuda Toshihiko has argued, 
Koreans had been legally able to vote in local elections since at least 
the passage of the Common Law of 1918. Yet, politicians who debated 
the Universal Manhood Suffrage Law seemed unaware of the existing 
legal status of Koreans with regard to suffrage, and similarly unaware 
of any impact the bill for expanded suffrage would have on the resident 
Korean population.12 The law regarding eligibility to vote in local elec-
tions before the passage of the 1925 Universal Manhood Suffrage Law, in 
addition to fairly substantial tax requirements, stated only that eligibil-
ity was restricted to male imperial subjects living in Japan (danshi taru 
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shinmin) and said nothing about ethnicity or nationality. Thus, when the 
tax requirements were lifted after 1925, the number of eligible Korean 
voters increased significantly.13
For reasons that demand further attention by scholars, there do not 
seem to have been debates in Japan centering around what U.S. historian 
Allison Sneider has called “suffrage imperialism.” Sneider argues that in 
the late nineteenth century, American suffragists increasingly pointed 
to the real or potential extension of voting rights to non-white men and 
other minorities (such as men from new American territories such as 
Hawai‘i and Santo Domingo, and Mormons in Utah) as a threat to the 
continued hegemony of white political power. She further notes that they 
used white fears about the enfranchisement of men of color as part of 
urgent appeals to grant suffrage to white American women, which would 
thus bolster white political supremacy.14 Despite a similarly expanding 
imperium in early twentieth-century Japan made up of the newly incor-
porated prefectures of Hokkaido and Okinawa, formal colonies including 
Taiwan and Korea, and a number of protectorates, I have not found evi-
dence in their writings to suggest that Japanese women’s suffrage advo-
cates concerned themselves with arguments about the (non-)desirability 
of allowing non-ethnically Japanese men to vote before Japanese women 
could do so. Perhaps this was due to the fairly small numbers of non-Jap-
anese men who were actually eligible to vote, or the even smaller number 
of those who successfully stood for office in local or national elections.
Yamakawa articulated her position on the 1925 Universal Manhood 
Suffrage Law and the issue of civic rights for Japan’s colonized peoples 
within the context of political organizing efforts taking place within the 
proletarian and communist left. “Special Demands of Women,” pub-
lished in the Hōchi shinbun newspaper in October 1925, formed one of 
Yamakawa’s most important and visible interventions in male-domi-
nated socialist political organizing, and it came as part of a larger social-
ist response to the 1925 expanded male suffrage law. Leftist organizations 
united to plan for the creation of a mass proletarian party in anticipation 
of the first election to take place after the law’s promulgation, scheduled 
for February 1928.15 Unions and proletarian organizations, including 
the leadership of the recently disbanded Japan Communist Party and its 
successor group the Japan Labor Union Council (Nihon Rōdō Kumiai 
Hyōgikai, known simply as Hyōgikai) met to discuss draft proposals for 
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such a mass party at the Proletarian Party Preparatory Council held in 
September 1925.16
Responding to these platforms in a document that elicited debate 
among proletarian movement leaders, Yamakawa first expressed great 
satisfaction that the various party platforms under consideration seemed 
to be largely in agreement on significant practical and ideological points, 
and delighted at the prospect that a mass proletarian political party 
might soon be formed. But in her “Special Demands of Women,” she 
identified only three items out of the party platform proposals submit-
ted that directly related to women. These included demands that all men 
and women over the age of eighteen be granted voting rights; that over-
time, night work, and dangerous work for women and children be pro-
hibited; and that women be granted paid maternity leave before and after 
childbirth.17
The suffrage plank in these platforms proposed a substantial reduc-
tion of the age of eligibility for voting rights from the current twenty-five 
years down to eighteen; and, equally as significant, they proposed that 
women as well as men have voting rights, a proposal that may possibly 
have reflected Yamakawa’s influence within the movement to that point. 
Yamakawa agreed strongly with this promotion of civil political rights 
for men and women, which after all formed the basis of the desire among 
leftist organizations to create a mass political party in the first place; that 
is, in expanding the franchise to men and women, and to younger men 
and women than could currently vote, the movement hoped to mobilize 
mass support for proletarian rights and sustain a mass movement that 
had not as yet materialized within Japan.
Suffrage and Women’s Rights
The expansion of suffrage after 1925 had in fact been the impetus for the 
original party platforms to which Yamakawa found herself responding. 
But instead of engaging at length with the issue of suffrage, Yamakawa 
used the dearth of additional provisions that spoke to women’s concerns 
as an opportunity to not only offer additional demands for women, but 
also to use those demands as a vehicle for theorizing women within 
Japanese Marxism. Quoting the draft platform of the Political Studies 
Association, she said:
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If we are to go beyond the statement “Completely removing 
feudal remnants and completing the bourgeoisification of soci-
ety are necessary in order to follow the path of socialism,” we 
must also recognize that demands for democracy that are closely 
bound up with the daily lives of women are also “necessary in 
order to follow the path of socialism.”18
The additional demands proposed by Yamakawa and the Women’s 
Division of the Political Studies Association (an organization headed 
by prominent communists like Sano Manabu and affiliated with the 
Labor Union Council) that she believed were necessary for any new mass 
proletarian party “in order to follow the path of socialism,” included 
the following:
1. The abolition of the head-of-household system.
2. The abolition of all laws relating to the [political] incapacity of 
women regardless of marital status; equal rights of men and women 
in marriage and divorce.
3. Equal opportunities of education and employment for women and 
peoples of the colonies with that of Japanese (naichi) men.
4. The implementation of a standard living wage without regard to 
ethnicity or sex.
5. The implementation of equal wages or salary without regard to 
occupation for people of the colonies and for men and women.
6. The provision of break rooms for women with nursing infants, 
and the allowance of at least thirty minutes every three hours 
for nursing.
7. The prohibition of the practice of firing women for reasons of mar-
riage, pregnancy, and childbirth.
8. The complete abolition of licensed prostitution.19
In the first two points Yamakawa shared much with her women’s 
suffrage colleagues. Both Yamakawa and the leadership of the Women’s 
Suffrage League argued throughout the prewar period that Japan’s legally 
codified family system, which designated a usually male head-of-house-
hold and excluded other family members (including wives) from owning 
property, denied women legal decision-making capacity. These provi-
sions of the Civil Code and its related laws became even more a target for 
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Ichikawa Fusae and other suffrage leaders in 1931, when a limited suf-
frage bill that would have allowed women to vote and, with the permis-
sion of their husbands, stand for election in local offices passed the lower 
house of the Diet. This gave hope to suffrage proponents that a full suf-
frage law might be enacted in the following Diet session.
In points three, four, and five, Yamakawa differed substantially from 
her Suffrage League colleagues, for whom issues of equality and inclusion 
for Japan’s colonized peoples had no bearing in consideration of suffrage 
or other rights for Japanese women.20 Her final three demands represent 
the heart of her concern for women’s rights as workers’ rights. By point-
ing to the most basic issues affecting working-class women—their access 
to continued employment even during and immediately after pregnancy, 
and their susceptibility to the unfree conditions placed upon women 
in the licensed prostitution system—she emphasized the importance of 
waged and other paid work for proletarian women.
In the same year Yamakawa presented her arguments for the special 
demands of women, she also authored a manifesto arguing for the cre-
ation of a women’s bureau within the Labor Union Council (Hyōgikai). 
Arguing in her “Thesis on a Women’s Bureau” (1925) that female factory 
workers “are the key to Japan’s labor movement,” she suggested a direc-
tion for the labor movement that would alleviate their poor working con-
ditions.21 This focus on female factory labor as the basis for much of her 
theorizing on women’s issues as well as her critique of Japan’s specific 
manifestation of capitalist development distinguished Yamakawa from 
her liberal feminist colleagues. While by no means monolithic in their 
own views, women’s suffrage activists focused their attention on those 
features of Japan’s political system such as the Civil Code that prevented 
women from exercising political rights.
Yamakawa focused on female factory labor and its relation to the 
recently codified family system to argue that capitalist leaders were 
entangled in a feudal “master/slave” relationship. That is, industrialists 
took the feudal family system of the agrarian countryside and extended 
it to their own factory dormitories, thus controlling female factory 
workers by restricting their bodily movements (jinshin kōsokuteki ni 
shihai suru).22 This relationship also controlled female factory workers 
internally, having transferred the custom of familial servitude to the 
factory and depriving them of the consciousness that their labor was 
being sold cheaply. As a result of this lack of human self-consciousness, 
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their awareness was not that of a “modern working class.” However, 
Yamakawa argued that men also suffered this lack of self-consciousness. 
Men extended to their social consciousness their own feudal view of the 
family and of women that constructed women as things they could pos-
sess, rather than as people whose life experiences had a similar class 
basis. Men in the socialist movement, she argued, needed to recognize 
that women’s issues, like men’s, were fundamentally class-based, and 
must be thought of as important issues related to the labor movement as a 
whole. Thus, creating class consciousness among female factory workers 
would destroy the feudal family relationship and the feudal relationships 
obtaining between the sexes. In short, her “Thesis” argued that men who 
did not realize or accept that women were the comrades of men fighting 
on the front lines of the class war were themselves “class traitors.”
Women’s Rights and Wartime Mobilization
Scholars working in the field of Japanese women’s history have under-
gone several shifts in how they view the wartime actions and writings 
of Japanese women’s rights activists. By “wartime” I mean the period 
beginning with the Manchurian Incident of September 1931, which 
prompted a significant expansion of Japanese military presence on the 
continent, and after which it became increasingly difficult for women, 
and indeed anyone, to openly criticize the state. The first postwar gen-
eration of women’s historians gave little attention to women in wartime. 
Instead, scholarly attention went toward excavating an early history of 
women’s activism, beginning with the Popular Rights Movement of the 
1880s and ending with the failure of the women’s suffrage movement 
after the Manchurian Incident pre-empted further attempts to press the 
Diet for full women’s suffrage. By the time women’s historians began 
examining the wartime period—marked as it was by the consolidation 
of women’s organizations and the mass appeal of state-sponsored groups 
such as the Patriotic Women’s Association (Aikoku Fujinkai) and the 
Women’s National Defense Association (Kokubō Fujinkai)—they found 
that the most prominent women’s rights groups and their leaders seemed 
to have been coopted by the state during the country’s period of mass 
mobilization. By the 1980s, several of the most vaunted figures in twen-
tieth-century women’s history, including the most prominent leader of 
the women’s suffrage movement, Ichikawa Fusae, became the targets of 
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scholarly critiques that they had willingly and knowingly supported the 
wartime state and its policies of imperialism and militarism.23
These critiques were part of a broader postwar analysis of tenkō, or 
“conversion.” The term tenkō was originally applied to Japanese com-
munists who, under the duress of imprisonment and often torture, had 
abandoned the party and its ideals in favor of a pro-state nationalism for 
the duration of the war. Eventually the term came to be applied more 
generally to a wide variety of social groupings and even to “the masses” 
to describe how teachers and students, workers, union members, mem-
bers of political parties, and even women’s rights activists appeared to 
abandon their oppositional stance and embrace nationalism and state-
directed goals during wartime.24
The theory of tenkō, however, has never adequately explained what 
appeared to be a sudden and complete reversal of ideological com-
mitments among those, like promoters of women’s suffrage, who had 
throughout the 1920s been the most vocal opponents of the state. Recently 
historians have offered a more complex analysis of what had previously 
appeared to be a “conversion” among women’s rights advocates. Narita 
Ryūichi has argued compellingly that in the case of Oku Mumeo, the 
prewar colleague of Ichikawa Fusae and co-founder of consumer rights–
focused women’s rights organizations, it is not so much that Oku changed 
her position from one of state opposition to state support, but rather that 
the wartime state came to adopt a number of positions she had held all 
along. Narita demonstrates that Oku’s primary concern before 1930 had 
been with women as mothers and family managers, and that she pro-
moted forms of cooperativism among women and families. Therefore, 
when the state began to promote such cooperativism and to valorize 
motherhood and the position of the housewife as part of its wartime 
mobilization policies, it should not come as a surprise that Oku quickly 
became a backer of state policies that now appeared to support the very 
policies toward women she had championed all along.25 Barbara Molony 
has made a slightly different argument, but one that performs the simi-
lar operation of rendering visible an internal logic and consistency of 
thought and action in what has been interpreted by others as an aban-
donment of principle by women activists who supported the militarist 
state. Molony suggests that a suffrage movement based on the demand 
for more institutionalized recognition of national belonging and state-
based rights inevitably aligned suffragists with state interests. Or as she 
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has put it, “the possibility of feminist support for heinous state policies 
was always embedded in the liberatory rhetoric of full civil rights.”26
Such analyses of women’s complicity with the wartime state and will-
ingness to embrace its goals have helped us better understand the nature 
of the women’s suffrage movement and women’s reform movements 
in the years before military mobilization. While people like Ichikawa 
never abandoned their hope for full women’s suffrage, the creation by the 
state of nationalist women’s organizations, cooperative associations, and 
increased protections for women during wartime gave many women’s 
rights activists enough of a sense of full subjecthood within the impe-
rial state that they were willing to defer other goals for the duration of 
the national crisis.
Yamakawa was one of the few prewar women’s rights activists who 
did not support state actions or the state mobilization of women during 
the war. Despite increasingly harsh censorship and the threat of police 
persecution, she published when she could during the late 1930s and early 
1940s, and what she published was frequently of an apolitical nature.27 
Her participation in a roundtable discussion published by the conserva-
tive-leaning journal Bungei shunjū in 1937 illustrates the way she nego-
tiated the need to appear in print to support herself economically, and 
the constraints put upon what she could say publicly in a political envi-
ronment increasingly hostile to criticism of the state. In “A Roundtable 
Discussion on the Problem of Women During Wartime,” Yamakawa 
appeared with other prominent women and men long involved in advo-
cating for women’s rights, including Hiratsuka Raichō, Tatewaki Sadayo, 
Okada Junko, and Katayama Tetsu. Published only months after the 
China Incident of July 1937 that launched Japan’s all-out war on the 
continent, and only months before Yamakawa’s own husband, Hitoshi, 
was arrested for his involvement in the Popular Front Movement that 
sought to create a united front within Japan against fascism, the round-
table revolved around the perception of drastic (and presumably posi-
tive) changes for women as a result of national mobilization by the state. 
While never explicitly criticizing the war, time and again throughout 
the roundtable Yamakawa challenged her colleagues’ assertions to point 
out that women had been working in these capacities long before state 
mobilization. Only now with the intensification of new forms of nation-
alist ideology, she argued, did many women possess a consciousness of 
the kinds of changes that had been taking place for women in Japanese 
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society for some time.28 While some scholars have pointed to her par-
ticipation in this roundtable as evidence of wartime complicity, my own 
reading suggests more of what Ienaga Saburō has referred to as a form of 
“passive resistance,” wherein a number of writers and leftists kept from 
being prosecuted under the provisions of the Peace Preservation Act by 
not criticizing the war, but nonetheless refused to actively or explicitly 
support it.29
The Dawn of Liberation
After the war, one of the first essays Yamakawa published was the 1946 
piece cited at the beginning of this chapter, titled “Standing at the Dawn 
of Liberation: An Historic General Election and Women’s Suffrage.”30 A 
brief introduction of its contents here will help demonstrate the consis-
tency of Yamakawa’s thought from her early works such as “About the 
Special Demands of Women” and “Thesis on a Women’s Bureau” from 
1925, through the period of the Occupation. Even in 1946, Yamakawa 
continued to debate her fellow women’s rights activists like Ichikawa 
Fusae, who she mentions by name.
In “Standing at the Dawn of Liberation,” Yamakawa reiterates her 
long-standing criticisms of Japan’s prewar and wartime state that was to 
her characterized most significantly by authoritarianism and militarism. 
And in keeping also with her assessment that women’s issues are always 
also men’s issues, she stressed that,
This is a general election that has historic significance not only 
for women, but for men too. This is because men too are now able 
to express their political will for the first time without heavy-
handed interference from the government. What does it mean 
to have voting rights in a country with no freedom of speech, 
where there does not exist the power of the will of the people 
to be expressed through government, and where a deliberative 
assembly is no more than window dressing (keishiki)?31
Her critique of the wartime state would have resonated with readers 
experiencing the first years of foreign occupation after a devastating 
defeat, and suffering through food shortages, starvation, and massive 
loss of housing that resulted from Allied fire and atomic bombings. 
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Referring obliquely to the foreign-imposed postwar Constitution that 
granted women full political equality with men, including suffrage, 
Yamakawa points out, “Women’s suffrage did not come about by coinci-
dence, but was mixed with the blood of our husbands and sons who died 
in foreign lands. With their blood, the military dictatorship fell from its 
self-imposed wounds. Japan’s democracy is a result of this, and women’s 
suffrage is one part of that democracy.”32
Engaging yet again with Ichikawa and leaders of the suffrage move-
ment, she insisted that the high rates of abstention among women voters 
about which Ichikawa had expressed concern in the lead-up to the gen-
eral election were more an indication of the penetration of democratic 
ideals than, as Ichikawa argued, a fundamental problem of a lack of civic 
education among women. That is, Yamakawa saw abstention from voting 
itself as an act of volition and an exercise of an individual’s political 
rights. Political education, she argued, is a very personal process. It would 
be in the process of participating in a democracy that a sense of politi-
cal autonomy would be created among women. Further, because women 
now have political rights, men, she said, were beginning to see women as 
full human beings.33
Conclusion
Yamakawa is famous for having worked relentlessly to critique Japan’s 
prewar socialist movement for its lack of attention to women’s issues. Her 
impassioned argument for the creation of a Women’s Bureau within the 
leadership organization of the proletarian political organizing commit-
tee, the Labor Union Council (Hyōgikai), reminded her male colleagues 
that women’s rights were also proletarian rights that male workers would 
do well to engage with for their own sakes. The “Special Demands of 
Women” of the late 1920s inspired an impassioned debate and put wom-
en’s issues once again before the eyes of a largely male socialist leader-
ship that often seemed ready to abandon working women as irrelevant 
to the cause of socialist revolution. No other single woman in prewar 
Japan was able to put women’s issues on a national socialist agenda as 
Yamakawa did.
In addition to her continual presence in person and in print as an 
oppositional figure operating simultaneously at the margins and the 
center of Japanese socialist political and organizational activities, during 
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the same decades she offered similarly relentless critiques of what she 
considered “bourgeois” women’s groups and their pursuit of liberal polit-
ical rights like suffrage that would benefit primarily elite women. Her 
1946 essay extolling the “dawn of liberation” that she believed would 
follow women’s newly acquired suffrage rights notwithstanding, she was 
highly ambivalent during the prewar period regarding the importance 
of advocating for women’s suffrage. But with the end of the war, and 
thus the end of the authoritarian and militarist state against which she 
had fought her entire adult life, Yamakawa could embrace the cause and 
the reality of suffrage without hesitation. This also marked the start of 
her willingness to try to effect change from within the political system 
as a bureaucrat, even as she continued to agitate for women’s and work-
ers’ rights. What other Japanese women would do with their new polit-
ical rights was up to them. For Yamakawa, this was truly the “dawn 
of liberation.”
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